

Avenue Q

“The Money Song”

NICKY: *Help the homeless! Help the homeless— Oooh! Hey, Princeton!*

Give me a quarter! Here in my hat!
Come on, Princeton, it's as easy as that!
Helping others brings you closer to God,
So give me a quarter. . .

PRINCETON: *I don't have any change.*

NICKY: *Hmm.*

Okay, give me a dollar.

PRINCETON: *That's not what I meant.*

NICKY:

Give me a five!

PRINCETON: *Are you kidding?*

NICKY:

The more you give, the more you get.
That's being alive!
All I'm asking you is to do what Jesus Christ would do:
He'd give me a quarter—why don't you?

PRINCETON: *All right, here you go. (He puts money in Nicky's hat.)*

NICKY: *Ahh, thanks!*

PRINCETON: *Take care. Whoa!*

NICKY: *What's the matter?*

PRINCETON: *I feel—generous! I feel—com·passionate!*

NICKY: *You do?*

PRINCETON: *Yeah! I feel like a new person—a good person. Helping other people out makes you feel fantastic!*

NICKY: *That's what I've been trying to tell you—*

PRINCETON: *All this time I've been running around thinking about me, me, me—and where has it gotten me! I'm gonna do something for someone else”*

NICKY: *Me?*

PRINCETON: *No—Kate! I'm going to raise the money to build that stupid Monster School she's always talking about!*

Give me your money!

NICKY: *What?*

PRINCETON:

I need it for Kate!

NICKY: *I need it to eat!*

PRINCETON:

Come one, Nicky?

NICKY:

Aww, get lost!

PRINCETON:

It'll make you feel great!

NICKY: *So would a burger!*

PRINCETON:

When her dream comes true, it'll be partly
thanks to you, so

Give me your money!

NICKY: *I'd like to, but I can't.*

PRINCETON:

Give me your money!

NICKY: *I'd like to, but I need it!*

PRINCETON:

Give me your money!

NICKY: *I'd like to, but I'm homeless! I can't! I need it! I'm homeless! I can't! I need it! I'm homeless! I
can't! I need it! I'm homeless!*

(Princeton slaps Nicky.)

NICKY: *Okay, here ya go.*

PRINCETON: *Thank you!*

NICKY:

Suddenly, I am feeling closer to God.

It's time to stop begging!

It's time to start giving!

What can I give to Rod?

Something he'll like so much he'll take me back. Ooh, I know! I'll find him a boyfriend!

PRINCETON: *That's the spirit!*

PRINCETON and NICKY:

When you help others,

You can't help helping yourself!

When you help others,

You can't help helping yourself!

GARY COLEMAN: *Hey boys, what's the hat for?*

NICKY: *Ooh, we're collecting money!*

PRINCETON: *It's for Kate! We're raising money
to help build her dream school!*

Give us your money!

NICKY:

You'll be glad that you do!

GARY COLEMAN:

That's just what my parents told me when I was
a kid!

Shit!

NICKY:

But giving feels so great. . .

GARY COLEMAN:

And I bet it wouldn't hurt your chances with
Kate.

PRINCETON: *Well, that too.*

GARY COLEMAN:

I'll give you a dollar.

PRINCETON:

You're a gentleman and a scholar!

CHRISTMAS EVE: *We so happy! We just
exchange all your wedding gifts for cash!*

BRIAN: *Uh, yeah. So—thanks, everybody!*

CHRISTMAS EVE: *We rich!*

PRINCETON:

Give us your money!

NICKY:

Give us your money!

GARY COLEMAN:

Give us you goddamn money!

PRINCETON:

Give us the dough!

NICKY:

Give us the dough!

PRINCETON and GARY and NICKY:

We're are raising money for a Monster School,
But we've got a ways to go!

PRINCETON:

Sounds like you've got money to burn. . .

NICKY:

And it's not like money that you had to earn. . .

PRINCETON and GARY and NICKY:

So give us your money—

BRIAN: *Sounds like a good cause.*

CHRISTMAS EVE: *Give me your wallet.*

(She rifles through Brian's wallet.)

PRINCETON: *Oh my gosh! I don't know how to thank you guys. I mean, Kate will be so grateful. . .*

that kind of money is such a great start. . .

(She hands Gary some cash.)

GARY COLEMAN: *Yeah! Fifteen dollars!*

PRINCETON: *Fifteen dollars?*

CHRISTMAS EVE: *Every little bit help!*

NICKY: *Looks like we're gonna have to ask more people! (They turn to the audience and pass the hat.)*

ALL: *Hey!*

Give us your money! All that you've got!

Just fork it on over. . .

GARY COLEMAN:

Or some puppets will get shot!

PRINCETON: *Hey!*

ALL:

It's time to pass the hat.

GARY COLEMAN:

And there's nothing you can do 'bout that.

ALL:

So give us your money! Give us your money!

Give us your money!

When you help others,

You can't help helping yourself!

When you help others,

You can't help helping yourself!

Every time you do good deeds

You're also serving your own needs.

When you help others,

You're really helping yourself!

When you give to a worthy cause,

You'll feel as jolly as Santa Claus.
When you help others,
You can't help helping yourself!

資料 2

1. A common classification of Englishes

Perhaps the most common classification of Englishes, especially in the language teaching world, has been to distinguish between English as a native language (ENL), English as a second language (ESL) and English as a foreign language (EFL).

In this classification, ENL is spoken in countries where English is the primary language of the great majority of the population. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States are countries in which English is said to be spoken and used as a native language.

In contrast, ESL is spoken in countries where English is an important and usually official language, but not the main language of the country. These countries are typically ex-colonies of the United Kingdom or the United States. Nigeria, India, Malaysia and the Philippines are examples of countries in which English is said to be spoken and used as a second language.

The final classification of this model is EFL. EFL occurs in countries where English is not actually used or spoken very much in the normal course of daily life. In these countries, English is typically learned at school, but students have little opportunity to use English outside the classroom and therefore little motivation to learn English. China, Indonesia, Japan and many countries in the Middle East are countries in which English is said to operate as an EFL.

This ENL/ESL/EFL distinction has been helpful in certain contexts. There is no doubt, for example, that the motivation to learn English is likely to be far greater in countries where English plays an institutional or official role than in countries where students are unlikely to hear any English outside the classroom or ever need to use it. This classification, however, has shortcomings. One is that the term “native language” is open to misunderstanding. As speakers in ENL countries are described as native speakers, people feel that the variety used is a standard variety that is spoken by **all** of the people. People then feel that ENL is innately superior to ESL and EFL varieties and that it therefore represents a good model of English for people in ESL and EFL countries to follow. In actual fact, however, many different varieties of English are spoken in ENL countries. The idea that everyone speaks the same “standard model” is simply incorrect. Second, the suggestion to use ENL as “the model” ignores the fact that such a model might be inappropriate in ESL countries where the local variety would be a more acceptable model, as there are many fluent speakers and expert users of that particular variety.

A second shortcoming of the classification is that the spread of English also means that it is more difficult to find countries that can be accurately classified as EFL countries. As we shall see, English is playing an increasing role in EFL countries such as China and Japan. The ESL vs EFL distinction appears to be more valid when applied to the contrast between city and countryside. City dwellers in both ESL and EFL countries have far more opportunity and need to use English than their rural counterparts. Furthermore, ESL varieties are said to operate in countries that were once colonies of Britain or America, but, as I shall show below, the type of colony has influenced the current roles of

English in such countries. (Kirkpatrick 27-28)

2. Differences between British and American variations of English

What are some of the differences between the standard British and American dialects? As with all varieties, the most noticeable difference between them is in their different pronunciations. One difference is that the /j/ glide after certain consonants does not occur in American English. Thus a “duke” is a /dju:k/ in conservative RP, but is a /du:k/ in American English, although /dʒu:k/ is also common in Britain. Stress patterns on words also differ. A British “laboratory” has four syllables with the main stress on the second, an American “laboratory” has five syllables with more or less equal stress on each. “Extraordinary” has four syllables with the main stress on the second syllable in British English, but six syllables and main stresses on the first and third syllables in American English. “Fertile” is /fɜ:taɪl/ in British English and /fɜ:təl/ in American. Similarly, a “missile” is a /mɪsaɪl/ in British and a /mɪsəl/ in American. The American pronunciations are not necessarily newer than the British ones. For example, the American pronunciations of “fertile” and “missile” retain the original English pronunciations of these two words.

There are also many differences in vocabulary. . . . [W]hen the British and Americans talk about cars and driving, you would think they were talking about completely different things. In England, cars have bonnets, boots, gear levers, number plates, tyres and windscreens. In America, they have hoods, trunks, stick shifts, license plates, tires and windshields. In England, drivers stop at pedestrian or zebra crossings and at traffic lights. They go round roundabouts and avoid driving on the pavement. They drive on motorways and ring roads, they pull off at junctions and pull up on the hard shoulder. In America, drivers stop at crosswalks and stop lights. They go round traffic circles and avoid driving on the sidewalk. They drive on interstates and beltways and exit at exits and pull off at pull offs.

There are also grammatical differences. In certain contexts, an American can use the past simple tense when a British speaker would use the present perfect. For example, “Did you buy your car yet?” is possible in American English but, in British English, a speaker would say “Have you bought your car yet?”

Differences also exist in the way people speak to each other. For example, when greeting and leave taking the British may say “How are you?” and “Goodbye,” while Americans may say “How are you doing?” and “Have a nice day.” (Kirkpatrick 58)

Possible topics for discussion:

1. What do you think about the standard English. Is it possible that such a thing exists? If so, do you think that you have to learn it if you want to speak a “good” English?
2. Do you think of other examples that distinguish British and American versions of English?
3. If you have to choose from British and American versions of English, which do you prefer? And why?

資料 3

A. What is culture?

Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language. This is so partly because of its intricate historical development, in several European languages, but mainly because it has now come to be used for important concepts in several distinct intellectual disciplines and in several distinct and incompatible systems of thought.

The fw is *cultura*, L, from rw *colere*, L. *Colere* had a range of meanings: inhabit, cultivate, protect, honour with worship. Some of these meanings eventually separated, though still with occasional overlapping, in the derived nouns. Thus “inhabit” developed through *colonus*, L to *colony*. “Honour with worship” developed through *cultus*, L to *cult*. *Cultura* took on the meaning of cultivation or tending. . . though with subsidiary medieval meanings of honour and worship. . . . The French forms of *cultura* were *couture*, oF, which has since developed its own specialized meaning, and later *culture*, which by eC15 had passed into English. The primary meaning was then in husbandry, the tending of natural growth. (Williams 87)

B. Three basic definitions

We can easily distinguish the sense which depends on a literal continuity of physical process as now in “sugar-beet culture” or, in the specialized physical application in bacteriology since the 1880s, “germ culture.” But once we go beyond the physical reference, we have to recognize three broad active categories of usage. The source of two of these we have already discussed: (i) the independent and abstract noun which describes a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development, from C18; (ii) the independent noun, whether used generally or specifically, which indicates a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group, or humanity in general. . . . But we have also to recognize (iii) the independent and abstract noun which describes the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity. This seems often now the most widespread use: **culture** is music, literature, painting and sculpture, theatre and film. . . . This use, (iii), is relatively late. (Williams 90)

C. Definitions of culture in several disciplines

Faced by this complex and still active history of the word, it is easy to react by selecting one “true” or “scientific” sense and dismissing other senses as loose or confused. . . . It is clear that, within a discipline, conceptual usage has to be clarified. But in general it is the range and overlap of meanings that is significant. The complex of senses indicates a complex argument about the

relations between general human development and a particular way of life, and between both and the works and practices of art and intelligence. It is especially interesting that in archeology and in *cultural anthropology* the reference to **culture** or **a culture** is primarily to *material* production, while in history and *cultural studies* the reference is primarily to *signifying* or *symbolic* systems. This often confuses but even more often conceals the central question of the relations between “material” and “symbolic” production. . . . (Williams 91)

Note on abbreviations:

fw: immediate forerunner of a word, in the same or another language.

rw: ultimate traceable word, from which “root” meanings are derived.

L: Latin.

oF: Old French.

eC15: first period (third) of the fifteenth century.

C18: the eighteenth century

Possible topics for discussion:

1. The first article says “**Culture** is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language.” What other words do you think were on the author’s mind when he wrote this passage?
2. The second article mentions three distinct usages of the word “culture.” How do you translate each of these into Japanese?
3. The third article offers a useful distinction between “material” and “symbolic” systems of production. Can you explain what each of these exactly means? Or can you provide some examples for each of these?

For a successful presentation:

Read the passage carefully and compare your interpretation with those of the other members of your group. And if necessary, do some research on the Internet or other resources. Then make your presentation as concise and easy-to-understand as possible, using photos, diagrams or links to websites.

3 . American Immigration Policy

Whereas most of the immigration to Europe has come in two big bursts—in the 1950s and 1960s, and since the 1990s—immigration to the US has taken off only since the 1970s (although many Mexican farmworkers were allowed to come work on a temporary basis in the 1950s and early 1960s). While the US admitted only 2.5 million permanent immigrants in the 1950s and 3.3 million in the 1960s, it allowed in 4.5 million in the 1970s, 7.3 million in the 1980s and 9.1 million in the 1990s. Most of these immigrants live in just six states (California, New York, Florida, Texas, Illinois and New Jersey), but they are starting to spread out across the country.

The watershed year was 1965, when US immigration rules were reformed as part of the broader push for civil rights. The national quotas designed to keep out Latin Americans and Asians were abolished and preference given instead to the relatives of US citizens and residents. The reform was not designed to encourage immigration or alter its composition: it was reasoned that giving preference to reuniting families would skew the system in favour of existing immigrant groups. But in practice, it led to an upsurge in immigration, first from Europe and then from Asia and Latin America. The million or so refugees who had arrived from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, along with the existing Filipino and Korean communities, were much keener to sponsor the arrival of family members: Asians brought in four times as many relatives per initial immigrant than did Europeans or Latin Americans.

At the same time, illegal migration, mostly from Mexico, has soared, with twelve million undocumented residents believed to be in the country. A limited amnesty after 1986 produced three million applications, over two-thirds of them from Mexicans, while new sanctions were imposed on employers of illegal workers. But with documents easy to falsify, the employer sanctions proved ineffective, prompting a change of strategy in the 1990s toward tougher border controls and the denial of welfare benefits to illegal residents.

In 1990 US immigration rules were reformed again to increase the number of immigrants admitted on the basis of their skills rather than their family connections or refugee status. A worldwide lottery was also established, granting 55,000 entry visas a year at random to citizens of countries other than the eleven that have sent the most legal migrants to the US. Applicants simply have to post their names and photographs along with those of their spouse and children to a processing centre. In 2000, Congress tripled the number of temporary work visas available for skilled workers to 195,000 a year, although this fell back to 65,000 again in 2004.

Canada has encouraged immigration throughout the post-war period. At first, only Europeans were admitted, mainly Britons and then Germans, Italians and Dutch; after the introduction in 1976 of a points system for selecting immigrants that did not discriminate on the basis of nationality, non-Europeans were allowed in too. The number of immigrants let in each year has risen sharply, with an emphasis on attracting skilled workers, selected since 2001 using broader criteria such as their level of education, language ability and possession of flexible and transferable skills rather than specifically on the basis of their occupation.

Australia was even more pro-active in attracting immigrants in the post-war period. Under the slogan “Populate or Perish,” the government sought to lure immigrants and their families to settle in Australia. At first, pride of place was given to Britons, but when not enough could be attracted, white Europeans were also admitted, first from eastern and northern Europe, but then also from southern Europe. In the 1950s, most migrants came from Italy and Greece. But by the late 1960s, migration from increasingly prosperous southern Europe had slowed to a trickle, prompting the government to widen the net to Yugoslavia and Latin America, and to make family reunion even easier.

After the repeal of the “White Australia” policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the adoption of its own non-racially based points system for grading prospective migrants, Australia attracted increasing numbers of economic migrants from Asia, rising to half of the immigrant intake in the early 1990s. But the long-standing pro-immigration stance was reversed in 1996, limiting family reunion, excluding asylum seekers and putting a greater emphasis on skilled migration. (Legrain 49-51)

<参考資料——人種構成の変化>

	1970年	1980年	1990年
総人口	2億 321.2万	2億 2654.6万	2億 4871万
白人	1億 7774.9万／87.47%	1億 8903.5万／83.44%	1億 9968.6万／80.28%
黒人	2258万／11.11%	2648.2万／11.69%	2998.6万／12.06%
先住アメリカ人	79.3万／0.39%	153.4万／0.68%	195.9万／0.79%
アジア・太平洋系		372.6万／1.64%	727.4万／2.92%
日本系	59.1万／0.29%	71.6万	84.8万
中国系	43.5万／0.22%	81.2万	164.6万
フィリピン系	34.3万／0.17%	78.2万	140.7万
その他		141.6万	337.3万
その他	72.1万／0.35%	576.8万／2.57%	980.5万／3.94%
ヒスパニック系		1460.4万／6.45%	2235.4万／8.99%

(出典：富田虎男／鶴月裕典／佐藤円編著『アメリカの歴史を知るための60章』明石書店、2000年)

4. Melting-Pot America? A Move toward Multiculturalism

The US has traditionally taken a third way—the so-called “melting-pot” approach—which involves give and take on both sides. Immigrants have to pledge their allegiance to the United States and sign up to the values in the Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution, but they don’t have to adopt any particular cultural habits, Anglo-Protestant or otherwise. Over time, each influx of immigrants changes and enriches American culture, which they adapt freely to American ways, although they may retain some of their cultural heritage. Irish-Americans celebrate St Patrick’s Day;

Mexican-Americans have a fiesta on 5 May; Korean-Americans watch Korean-language TV. This approach has worked remarkably well until now. But America's affirmative-action laws, which discriminate in favour of minority groups, are contributing to an increasingly fractious assertion of group rights. As Stepan Kerkyasharian, who runs the Sydney-based Community Relations Commission for New South Wales in Australia, points out, "specific laws giving specific privileges to specific people force citizens by legislation or inducement to make a conscious choice: do you belong to the majority or do you want to belong to an identified minority so as to enjoy the privileges of that minority, while contracting out of the privileges of the majority? It's a formula for disaster." In practice, then, the US has veered towards a multicultural approach—and a fractious one at that. (Legrain 261)

5. Conform to What? The Changing Nature of American Values

Immigrants are forever being urged to conform to local ways. But conform to what? Fifty years ago, many would have argued that the core norms of society included traditional codes of behaviour and morality. Happy (or not-so-happy) families with dad at work, mum at home and kids who put up and shut up were viewed as good; divorce, single parents, working mums, unmarried couples, independent teenagers: bad. Gays? Ugh! Christianity was good; Judaism and atheism less good, but tolerated. Thankfully, times have changed. The pendulum has swung dramatically from social conformism in personal behaviour towards what critics call "rampant individualism" and what supporters might call "doing your own thing." The notion that people should conform to a set way of behaving, that they should all think in the same way or have the same set of values is increasingly rejected. And even though a vocal minority disagrees, society broadly accepts a diversity of family values, while outlawing discrimination on the basis of sex, race, sexuality and so on. Society is now a church broad enough to include nuns as well as sexually liberated women, straights, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals, stay-at-home dads and career women, Marxists and libertarians, eco-warriors and corporate big-wigs, people who think Western civilisation is the bee's kees as well as those who see it as the root of all evil. And all of them rub along together pretty well. While there is no denying that people need some things in common in order to coexist peacefully, the remaining moral norms are not too hard for most outsiders to observe: broad, common standards of right and wrong, for instance. (Legrain 272-73)

資料2 リサーチ&プレゼンテーション

註：文中に出てくる Brimelow は、アメリカの統一性（unity）を脅かすものとして Bilingualism、Multiculturalism、そして Affirmative Action をやり玉にあげるが、批判の主な対象は移民である。

A. Problems of Bilingualism

Start with bilingualism. Why is the fact that many Americans are actively encouraged to—and increasingly do—learn and speak another language as well as English corrosive of American nationhood, or indeed a bad thing in any way? Surely it is beneficial for many people to speak two or more languages. People in every other country are forever being encouraged to learn another language: it broadens the mind, introduces you to a different culture, helps you better understand your own, and is useful for business and travel. And even though people around the world are increasingly learning English as their second language, they are not forgetting their mother tongue or losing their sense of nationhood. Why then should the American nation crumble if some—or many—Americans speak Spanish as well as English? There is no evidence that Americans are speaking Spanish *instead* of English. . . : indeed, if the incentive to learn English is so strong that Chinese and Russians are doing it, surely Mexicans who live and work in the US will do so too.

B. Attacks on Multiculturalism

Move on to multiculturalism, by which [Peter] Brimelow means that “immigrants are officially not expected to assimilate.” The question is: assimilate to what? If assimilation means respecting the same laws as other Americans—and all the cultural specificities that those laws embody—then immigrants are clearly still expected to assimilate. If assimilation means believing in the “American dream” of achieving greater things through hard work and merit, then the overwhelming majority of immigrants subscribe to it with gusto. If assimilation means changing the colour of their skin, then that is impossible. If assimilation means adopting American values and cultural customs, then should all immigrants watch *Seinfeld* or *Oprah*; worship in a church, a synagogue, at home or not at all; support a woman’s “right to choose” or oppose abortion; believe in free markets or the New Deal? The reality of modern America is its great diversity, irrespective of immigration. So when Brimelow advocates a vast Americanisation campaign, to purge America of diversity, multiculturalism, foreign languages and hyphenated identities, how exactly, and with what, does he intend to scrub blacks, Asians and Latinos clean?

C. Affirmative Action Is Problematic

He does have a point about the pernicious impact of well-meaning affirmative action—the preferential hiring and promoting of minorities such as native Americans, blacks, Asians and Hispanics. There is no denying that giving some people privileges at others’ expense damages national unity and gives those in the majority a legitimate interest in how many people enjoy those privileges. As Brimelow puts it: “Because of affirmative action quotas, it absolutely matters to me as the father of a white male how large the ‘protected classes’ are going to be. And that is basically

determined by immigration.” But he is wrong to finger immigration for exacerbating the problem. And his solution—that “No immigrant should count as a member of a ‘protected class’ for the purposes of US affirmative action programs”—is unworkable, because one cannot legally distinguish between immigrants and native-born Americans once immigrants have become citizens without creating two classes of citizenship, which would be even more divisive.

C. A Misdirected Blame

Regardless of how many newcomers arrive in America, and regardless of the grounds, historic or otherwise, for trying to help some people more than others, giving privileges to those who identify themselves as separate minorities is corrosive of national unity. To attack immigration because of affirmative action is politically expedient but intellectually incorrect—affirmative action is causing American society to splinter regardless. Short of purging the United States of everyone but whites—something even Brimelow does not have the temerity to suggest—there is no escaping the noxious impact of affirmative action. And even if there were only whites in the US, minorities would still have an incentive to distance themselves from the majority: Italian-Americans seeking redress from Scots-Americans, Irish-Americans from German-Americans, and so on. As for the “systematic attack on the value of citizenship” that Brimelow bemoans, if anything this has gone into reverse as social benefits that were once available to all US residents are now reserved for US citizens.

(以上の引用は Legrain 213-15 からの抜粋)

資料1 参考資料リンク集

1. **Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965** (1965年の改正移民法)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immigration_and_Nationality_Act_of_1965

2. **US Census Bureau** (国勢調査)

<http://www.census.gov/>

3. **Pledge of Allegiance** (忠誠の誓い)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pledge_of_Allegiance

"I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."

4. **1950s Ford TV Ad** (アメリカ的価値観)

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m7t9YIMxWoE&feature=related>

5. **Father Knows Best Thanksgiving** (典型的なアメリカの家族)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Y1__b6uyxg

6. **The Simpsons Trapped in Vending Machines** (現代アメリカの家族像)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NX_23r7vYak&feature=related

7. **House Divided** (リンカーンの演説)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lincoln's_House_Divided_Speech

"A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this government cannot endure, permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved — I do not expect the house to fall — but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other.

Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new — North as well as South.

資料3 アファーマティブ・アクションについて

A. アファーマティブ・アクションとは

アファーマティブ・アクションは64年の公民権法の副産物として生まれた。法的な差別はなくなったとはいえ、奴隷制時代、解放後の人権分離の時代に黒人は差別に苦しみ、十分な教育を受ける機会を奪われてきた。そこで、ジョンソン大統領の行政命令11246によって、連邦政府と事業契約を結ぶ企業や団体は、人種、宗教、出身国、皮膚の色による差別が禁止されただけでなく、マイノリティの従業員がそうした差別を受けないように、「アファーマティブ・アクション」、すなわち積極的な措置をとることが求められた。具体的には、募集、採用、昇進、解雇などの分野が含まれ、契約者はこの条件に違反すると、契約が取り消されることになった。68年には性による差別も禁止され、女性もこの規則の対象となった。市立や州立の大学への入学も優先的におこなわれるようにもなった。こうした仕事と学業面での優遇策によって、黒人の中産階級が形成された。

公民権法は差別をなくすものだが、アファーマティブ・アクションはマイノリティを優遇する、つまり特定の人種や性を特別扱いし、白人の男性を差別するという結果になった。差別で差別を是正するという自己矛盾である。当然、白人男性から逆差別であるという訴訟が続き、最高裁もしだいにアファーマティブ・アクションに厳しい態度を示すようになった。(……)

97年末のニューヨーク・タイムズ/CBS ニュースの世論調査によると、アファーマティブ・アクション廃止を支持する白人は52%もいるが、マイノリティのための職業訓練に政府が資金を出すことに賛成する白人は64%、大学入学のための準備教育に賛成する白人は59%もいる。白人に恵まれない人への同情がないわけではない。アメリカ人は世界一豊かだが、慈善団体への寄付金やボランティア活動も世界一多い。彼らは、弱者を助けるなど主張しているのではなく、政府が個人の生活に一方的に関わることに反対するのである。努力しようとする人間は必ず報われるのだから、政府はその機会を与えるべきで、結果を与えてはいけない、と考えるアメリカ人は多い。(明石/川島編著 64-67)

B. Two Arguments for affirmative action

The real affirmative action debate is about two other rationales—the compensatory argument and the diversity argument.

Compensating for Past Wrongs

The compensatory argument views affirmative action as a remedy for past wrongs. It says minority students should be given preference to make up for a history of discrimination that has placed them *しししし* at an unfair disadvantage. This argument treats admission primarily as a benefit to the recipient and seeks to distribute the benefit in a way that compensates for past injustice and its lingering effects.

But the compensatory argument runs into a tough challenge: critics point out that those who benefit are not necessarily those who have suffered, and those who pay the compensation are seldom those responsible for the wrongs being rectified. Many beneficiaries of affirmative action are middle-class minority students who did not suffer the hardships that afflict young African Americans and

Hispanics from the inner city. Why should an African American student from an affluent Houston suburb get an edge over Cheryl Hopwood, who may actually have faced a tougher economic struggle?

If the point is to help the disadvantaged, critics argue, affirmative action should be based on class, not race. And if racial preferences are intended to compensate for the historic injustice of slavery and segregation, how can it be fair to exact that compensation from people such as Hopwood, who played no part in perpetrating the injustice?

Whether the compensatory case for affirmative action can answer this objection depends on the difficult concept of collective responsibility: Can we ever have a moral responsibility to redress wrongs committed by a previous generation? To answer this question, we need to know more about how moral obligations arise. Do we incur obligations only as individuals, or do some obligations claim us as members of communities with historic identities? . . .

資料1 アメリカの個人主義

A. アメリカ的な考えの核にあるもの

We are divided, we are told, by race, by culture, by creed, by differing views of the national identity. But we are united, as it turns out, in at least one core belief, even across lines of color, religion, region, and occupation: the belief that economic success or misfortune is the individual's responsibility, and his or hers alone. (Bellah, et al. xiii-xiv)

解説: これまでの授業で見てきたように、アメリカ社会の多様性にはその社会そのものの存続を危うくするようなどころがある。Divided な状態のものを United な形で保つものは、個人主義であり、自己責任の思想であるとここでは主張されている。

B. 貧富の差の是正は社会主義的

Within the United States, the gap between rich and poor has grown in recent decades, reaching levels not seen since the 1930s. Yet inequality has not loomed large as a political issue. Barack Obama's modest proposal to return income tax rates to where they stood in the 1990s prompted his 2008 Republican opponents to call him a socialist who wanted to spread the wealth. (Sandel 265-66)

解説: 戦後からソ連解体まで続いた東西冷戦（ベトナム戦争も朝鮮戦争もその局地戦である）が、アメリカ人の反共産主義・反社会主義感情を強めた。しかしそもそもアメリカでは伝統的に、政府が権力を発動して社会的平等を実現することへの反感が強い。アメリカ人の理想は「小さな政府 (small government)」であり「自由放任主義 (laissez-faire)」である。個人の自由に制限を加えるものは何であれ悪と見なされ、国民の利益を侵害する政府は廃止しても良いということが独立宣言にも書かれている。したがってオバマ政権の懸案である国民健康保険の創設も、個人の権利と自己責任の思想にそぐわないものであることから、日本人が考えるほどにはアメリカ人の賛同を得られないでいる。

C. アメリカの個人主義とはどのようなものか

Individualism, the first language in which Americans tend to think about their lives, value independence and self-reliance above all else. These qualities are expected to win the rewards of success in a competitive society, but they are also valued as virtues good in themselves. For this reason, individualism places high demands upon every person even as the open nature of American society entices with chances of big rewards.

American individualism, then, demands personal effort and stimulates great energy to achieve, yet it provides little encouragement for nurturance, taking a sink-or-swim approach to moral development as well as to economic success. It admires toughness and strength and fears softness and weakness. It adulates winners while showing contempt for losers, a contempt that can descend with crushing weight on those considered, either by others or by themselves, to be moral or social failures. (Bellah, et al. xiv)

ディスカッションのポイント：

- 1) アメリカの個人主義とはどのようなものか
- 2) 成功した人物はどのように評価されるか
- 3) 勝ち組と負け組を分ける基準は単に経済的格差だけか

D. 個人主義と自由の関係

Like other Americans, he thinks of freedom very much as freedom *from*—from people who have economic power over you, from people who try to limit what you can do or say. This ideal of freedom has historically given Americans a respect for individuals; it has, no doubt, stimulated their initiative and creativity; it has sometimes even made them tolerant of differences in a diverse society and resistant to overt forms of political oppression. But it is an ideal of freedom that leaves Americans with a stubborn fear of acknowledging structures of power and interdependence in a technologically complex society dominated by giant corporations and an increasingly powerful state. The ideal of freedom makes Americans nostalgic for their past, but provides few resources for talking about their collective future. (Bellah, et al. 25)

解説：自由（freedom）には基本的に二つの種類がある。それらはそれぞれ積極的な自由と消極的な自由とも呼べるものだ。積極的な自由は「～をする自由」であり、もう一方の消極的な自由は「～からの自由」と考えると分かりやすい。引用で問題となっているのは後者の消極的な自由であり、個人の言動に制限を加えるようなものからの自由である。引用箇所を参考に、以下のポイントを議論してみたい。

ディスカッションのポイント：

- 1) 自由の理念が個人の価値を高めるのはなぜか
- 2) 現代ではこうした自由の理念はどのような問題に直面しているか
- 3) 昔は良かったと懐かしむようなノスタルジーはなぜ問題なのか

F. 貧富の差は共同体を崩壊させる

Too great a gap between rich and poor undermines the solidarity that democratic citizenship requires. Here's how: As inequality deepens, rich and poor live increasingly separate lives. The affluent send their children to private schools (or to public schools in wealthy suburbs), leaving urban public schools to the children of families who have no alternative. A similar trend leads to the secession by the privileged from other public institutions and facilities. Private health clubs replace municipal recreation centers and swimming pools. Upscale residential communities hire private security guards and rely less on public police protection. A second or third car removes the need to rely on public transportation. And so on. The affluent secede from public places and services, leaving them to those who can't afford anything else.

This has two bad effects, one fiscal, the other civic. First, public services deteriorate, as those who no longer use those services become less willing to support them with their taxes. Second, public institutions such as schools, parks, playgrounds, and community centers cease to be places where citizens from different walks of life encounter one another. Institutions that once gathered people together and served as informal schools of civic virtue become few and far between. The hollowing out of the public realm makes it difficult to cultivate the solidarity and sense of community on which democratic citizenship depends. . . .

If the erosion of the public realm is the problem, what is the solution? A politics of the common good would take as one of its primary goals the reconstruction of the infrastructure of civic life. Rather than focus on redistribution for the sake of broadening access to private consumption, it would tax the affluent to rebuild public institutions and services so that rich and poor alike would want to take advantage of them.

An earlier generation made a massive investment in the federal highway program, which gave Americans unprecedented individual mobility and freedom, but also contributed to the reliance on the private automobile, suburban sprawl, environmental degradation, and living patterns corrosive to community. This generation could commit itself to an equally consequential investment in an infrastructure for civic renewal: public schools to which rich and poor alike would want to send their children; public transportation systems reliable enough to attract upscale commuters; and public health clinics, playgrounds, parks, recreation centers, libraries, and museums that would, ideally at least, draw people out of their gated communities and into the common spaces of a shared democratic citizenship.

Focusing on the civic consequences of inequality, and ways of reversing them, might find political traction that arguments about income distribution as such do not. It would also help highlight the connection between distributive justice and the common good. (Sandel 266-68)

ディスカッションのポイント :

- 1) 貧富の差はいかにしてアメリカ社会を分断するのか
- 2) 市民社会の復興にはどんな対策が必要か

資料3 グループによるプレゼンテーション

以下の三つの引用では、アメリカ社会を束ねるものについての説明がなされています。特に何が重要な論点であるかをグループで話し合い、内容とポイントを簡潔にまとめて発表してください。

G. Success

... Americans tend to think of the ultimate goals of a good life as matters of personal choice. The means to achieve individual choice, they tend to think, depend on economic progress. This dominant American tradition of thinking about success does not, however, help very much in relating economic success to our ultimate success as persons and our ultimate success as a society.

A century and a half ago, when most Americans still lived in small towns and worked in small businesses or on family-owned farms, the requirements of economic success were perhaps more easily reconciled with understandings of success in family and civic life. In that context, running a profitable farm or business would often have required a reputation for being a good family person and a public-spirited citizen, the meaning of which would be defined in terms of the conventions of one's local community. . . .

But only a small percentage of Americans now work in small business in small towns. Most of us work in large public or private bureaucracies. To be a success at work means to advance up the hierarchy of such corporations by helping the corporation make a good profit. But how is this kind of success related to a more fundamental kind of success in life? . . . If Joe's corporation should ever decide to move its Suffolk factory away from New England to a cheaper labor market, or if the company should offer Gorman an exceptionally good promotion to work at its Houston headquarters, Joe may face serious difficulties reconciling the requirements of economic success with his loyalties to his home town.

Someone like Brian Palmer has . . . already encountered such difficulties. We have seen him wrestle with the question of how to integrate his ambitions to climb the corporate ladder with his desire to have a good family life. This caused him problems, not only because the pressures of work sometimes kept him from spending adequate time with his family, but, even more subtly, because the way of thinking about success that helped him move up the corporate ladder was inappropriate for adequately comprehending the goals of a good family life. (Bellah, et al. 22-23)

H. Freedom

Freedom is perhaps the most resonant, deeply held American value. In some ways, it defines the good in both personal and political life. Yet freedom turns out to mean being left alone by others, not having other people's values, ideas, or styles of life forced upon one, being free of arbitrary authority in work, family, and political life. What it is that one might do with that freedom is much more difficult for Americans to define. And if the entire social world is made up of individuals, each

endowed with the right to be free of others' demands, it becomes hard to forge bonds of attachment to, or cooperation with, other people, since such bonds would imply obligations that necessarily impinge on one's freedom. Thus Margaret Oldham, for example, sets great store on becoming an autonomous person, responsible for her own life, and she recognizes that other people, like herself, are free to have their own values and to lead their lives the way they choose. But then, by the same token, if she doesn't like what they do or the way they live, her only right is the right to walk away. In some sense, for her, freedom to be left alone is a freedom that implies being alone.

For Margaret. . . to be free is not simply to be left alone by others; it is also somehow to be your own person in the sense that you have defined who you are, decided for yourself what you want out of life, free as much as possible from the demands of conformity to family, friends, or community. From this point of view, to be free psychologically is to succeed in separating oneself from the values imposed by one's past or by conformity to one's social milieu, so that one can discover what one really wants. . . . The difficulty, of course, is that this vision of freedom as freedom *from* the demands of others provides no vocabulary in which. . . Americans can easily address common conceptions of the ends of a good life or ways to coordinate cooperative action with others. Indeed, Brian points out that one thing he likes in California is the freedom people have to do what they want as long as they stay within the walls of their own houses and do not impinge on others. Implicit here, of course, is an image of self-sufficiency, as if Brian will, on his own in the context of his own small family, be able to imbue his children with "values" independently of what his neighbors are doing behind the walls of their own homes. The larger hope that his freedom might encompass an ability to share a vision of a good life or a good society with others, to debate that vision, and come to some sort of consensus, is precluded in part by the very definition of freedom Brian holds. (Bellah, et al. 23-24)

I. Justice

Our American traditions encourage us to think of justice as a matter of equal opportunities for every individual to pursue whatever he or she understands by happiness. Equal opportunities are guaranteed by fair laws and political procedures—laws and procedures applied in the same way to everyone. But this way of thinking about justice does not in itself contain a vision of what the distribution of goods in a society would end up looking like if individuals had an equal chance to pursue their interests. Thus, there could be a great disparities in the income given to people in different occupations in a just society so long as everyone had an equal chance of getting a well-paid job. But if, as is now becoming painfully apparent, there are more qualified applicants than openings for the interesting jobs, is equal opportunity enough to assure justice? What of the socially disadvantaged for whom a fair race is to no avail since they are left well short of the starting line?

Our society has tried to establish a floor below which no one will be allowed to fall, but we have not thought effectively about how to include the deprived more actively in occupational and civic life. Nor

have we thought whether it is healthy for our society to give inordinate rewards to relatively few. We need to reach common understandings about distributive justice—an appropriate sharing of economic resources—which must in turn be based on conceptions of a substantively just society. Unfortunately, our available moral traditions do not give us nearly as many resources for thinking about distributive justice as about procedural justice, and even fewer for thinking about substantive justice.

Even a self-stylized radical such as Wayne Bauer has a difficult time going beyond notions of procedural justice. He is outraged because in Santa Monica the political cards have been stacked against poor tenants in favor of wealthy landlords. He wants to liberate tenants from this unfair system, to give them the same opportunities as rich people to exercise their wills individually. But he becomes confused when asked what kind of society, with what kind of distribution of wealth, the tenants should try to create once they have achieved a fair chance. There is, after all, not enough land near the coast in Southern California to accommodate everyone who would want to live there. If the mechanisms of free market are not to determine who should live in places like Santa Monica, how should that determination be made? How, in short, should scarce resources be distributed in the new social order created by liberated tenants? (Bellah, et al. 25-26)

< *Little Miss Sunshine*——作品解説 >

Little Miss Sunshine は 2006 年のアメリカ映画。アカデミー賞二部門を獲得した。日本でも当初は単館上映だったが、口コミで話題となり、急遽拡大上映され大ヒットした。

映画はニューメキシコ州アルバカーキに住む家族の物語。主な登場人物は、

オリーフ——ぽっちゃりした 7 歳の少女。「リトル・ミス・サンシャイン」コンテストの決勝大会に出場する。

リチャード——オリーフの父。人生の勝ち組になることに執着し、成功のためのハウツー本の出版を目論んでいる。

シェリル——オリーフの母。夫の考えに不満を持っている。タバコがやめられない。

ドウェイン——オリーフの兄。飛行機のパイロットを目指す若者。ニーチェに傾倒し、沈黙の誓いを立て、目的を達成するまでは一切喋らないことにしている。

グランパ——オリーフの祖父。エロじじいでなおかつ薬物使用の常習者。老人ホームを追い出された。オリーフにダンスの指導をしている。

フランク——シェリルの弟（兄？）。同性愛者で、アメリカにおけるマルセル・ブルースト研究の第一人者。自殺未遂事件をおこした。

物語はロードムービー形式ですすみ、家族六人がオンボロのバスに乗り込み、ミス・コンテストの行われるカリフォルニアに向かう道中の出来事がプロットの中になる。

< 観賞のポイント >

主人公の一家はみな負け犬 (losers) である。父親のリチャードは、人生において常に勝者 (winner) でありたいと願い、家族にもその考え方を押し付けるのだが、アメリカ的な成功神話を追い求めるリチャードのかたくなな態度は、家庭内の人間関係を悪くしてしまう。観賞の際は、まずリチャードが理想とする「勝ち組」とは何であるかを注意しておきたい。

ミスコンに参加するために旅にでる一家だが、彼ら全員が必ずしもこのコンテストの勝ち負けにこだわっているわけではない。むしろ重要なのは、強制的に家族全員で長旅に出なければならなくなったことで、彼らが家族の意味や、人生における勝ち負けの意味をあらためて考え始めるということである。したがって観賞のポイントのふたつ目として、家族の関係の変化ということ挙げておきたい。

それ以外にも、この映画が描くような現代アメリカの家族とそれを取り巻く文化について、様々なことが議論できると思われる。特に美少女コンテストというのは面白い研究テーマであり、ここにはアメリカ人がイメージする「成功」とは何であるかが、極端な形で表れているように思う。講師自身は、映画の終わりのコンテストのシーンを観ると、ちょっと不気味な感じがして恐ろしくなる。そのあたりの感想も含めて議論してみたい。

資料1 二つの“God Save the Queen”

The Sex Pistols, “God Save the Queen” (1977)

God save the Queen
A fascist regime
They made you a moron
A potential H-bomb.

God save the Queen
She ain't no human being
There is no future
In England's dreaming

Don't be told about what you want
Don't be told about what you need.
No future, no future, no future for you

God save the Queen
We mean it, man
We love our Queen
God saves

God save the Queen
'Cos Tourists are money
And our figurehead
Is not what she seems

Oh God save history
God save your mad parade
Oh Lord God have mercy
All crimes are paid.

When there's no future, how can there be sin
We're the flowers in the dustbin
We're the poison in your human machine
We're the future, your the future

God save the Queen

We mean it, man

We love our Queen

God saves

God save the Queen

We mean it man

And there is no future

In England's dreaming

No future, no future, no future for you

No future, no future, no future for me

No future, no future, no future for you

No future, no future, no future for you

<解説>

The Sex Pistols は 1970 年代イギリスのパンクシーンを代表するバンド。政府、王室、大手レコード会社などを対象にした強烈な風刺、過激なパフォーマンス、ボロボロのシャツを安全ピンで止めたような奇抜なファッションで人気を博すが、契約を巡るいざこざなどが原因で、結成からわずか二年で解散した。後のポピュラー音楽やファッションに与えた影響は絶大であり、イギリスのユースカルチャーを語る際には必ず言及される。



資料4 イングランド人のセルフイメージ

H. Once upon a time in England

Once upon a time the English knew who they were. There was such a ready list of adjectives to hand. They were polite, unexcitable, reserved and had hot-water bottles instead of a sex life: how they reproduced was one of the mysteries of the western world. They were doers rather than thinkers, writers rather than painters, gardeners rather than cooks. They were class-bound, hidebound and incapable of expressing their emotions. They did their duty. Fortitude bordering on the incomprehensible was a by word: "I have lost my leg, by God!" exclaimed Lord Uxbridge, as shells exploded all over the battlefield. "By God, and have you!" replied the Duke of Wellington. A soldier lying mortally wounded in a flooded trench on the Somme was, so the myth went, likely to say only that he "mustn't grumble." Their most prized possession was a sense of honour. They were steadfast and trustworthy. The word of an English gentleman was as good as a bond sealed in blood. (Paxman 1)

Q: What does this passage imply?

I. Why the English lack their national symbols?

What does this paucity of national symbols mean? You could argue that it demonstrates a certain self-confidence. No English person can look at the swearing of allegiance that takes place in American schools every day without feeling bewilderment: that sort of public declaration of patriotism seems so, well, naïve. When an Irishman wears a bunch of shamrock on St Patrick's Day, the English look on with patronizing indulgence: scarcely anyone sports a rose on St George's Day. This worldly wisdom soon elides into a general view that *any* public display of national pride is not merely unsophisticated but somehow morally reprehensible. George Orwell noticed it as long ago as 1948 when he wrote that

In left-wing circles it is always felt that there is something slightly disgraceful in being an Englishman, and that it is a duty to snigger at every English institution, from horse-racing to suet puddings. It is a strange fact, but it is unquestionably true, that almost any English intellectual would feel more ashamed of standing to attention during "God Save the King" than of stealing from a poor box.

No one stands for "God Save the Queen" any more, and any cinema manager who tried to revive the custom of playing the national anthem would find the place empty before he'd reached the end of the first verse. At the time of Orwell's irritation, left-wing intellectual disdain was cheap because the English didn't need to concern themselves with the symbols of their own identity: when you're top dog in the world's leading empire, you don't need to. (Paxman 11-12)

Q: What is the reason that English people do not need national symbols?

J. British not English: The author's experience

If you want to find out about what makes the English who they are, you quickly make two discoveries. Firstly, that this offshore island has been sufficiently intriguing to attract quite awesome numbers of foreign visitors eager to share their impressions with the rest of the world: there are libraries filled with books of reminiscences and travellers' tales. Secondly, very little at all has been written on the subject of English nationalism. This is mainly because, while you can find nationalist movements aplenty in Estonia or Ethiopia, they scarcely exist in England. Some of the reasons you can guess at quickly—no foreign occupation, no attempt to extinguish indigenous culture. And there is the obvious point that, apart from at a few football and cricket matches, England scarcely exists as a country: nationalism was, and remains, a *British* thing.

So, as Britain declines, all sorts of nasty things are crawling out under stones. Not long ago I received a brown manila envelope. The address was written in block capitals, a nondescript if not particularly educated handwriting. There was a postmark: "Hull." Mercifully, I opened the envelope with the point of a biro. It was just as well. The top edge of the single sheet of paper inside had been sewn with razor blades. On one side was a cartoon British soldier in World War Two tin helmet lying in a slit trench, rifle to his shoulder. Underneath, the same hand had scrawled, "Don't move, nigger." Overleaf was a gallows and a hangman's noose. My initials had been drawn inside the rope. At the bottom of the page was scratched in giant letters PROUD TO BE BRITISH. I forgot quite what inspired this attack. A similar nasty smell used to hang over the anti-Semitic mail I received when another dunderhead got it into what passed for his mind that I was part of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy to destroy the British state. There is nothing uniquely British about these comparatively very anodyne experiences, as any victim of German, French or Swiss racism could attest. My point is only that this sort of prejudice is attached to the idea of Britain rather than England. (Paxman 19-20)

Q: British and English—What's the difference?

K. Research and Presentation: Film and Englishness #1

There is a strong case for agreeing with Churchill that the Second World War had been his country's "finest hour." He was talking about Britain and the British Empire, but the values of that empire were the values which the English liked to think were something which they had invented. Certainly, the war and its immediate aftermath are the last time in living memory when the English had a clear and positive sense of themselves. They saw it reflected back in films like *In which We Serve*, Noël Coward's fictionalized account of the sinking of HMS *Kelly*. As the survivors of the destroyer, sunk by German dive-bombers, lie in their life-raft they recall the ship's history. What they are really calling up is a picture of the strength of England. The captain and the ratings may be divided by their

accents, but they share the same essential beliefs about what their country represents. It is an ordered, hierarchical sort of place in which the war is an inconvenience to be put up with, like rain at a village fête. It is a chaste, self-denying country which women know their place and children go dutifully and quietly to bed when told. “Don’t make a fuss,” say the wives to one another during an air raid, “we’ll have a cup of tea in a minute.” As the Chief Petty Officer leaves home his mother-in-law asks him when he’ll be ashore again.

“All depends on Hitler,” he says.

“Well, who *does* he think he is?” asks the mother-in-law.

“That’s the spirit.”

In Which We Served was unashamed propaganda for a people facing the possible extinction of their culture, which is the reason it is so illuminating. It shows us how the English liked to think of themselves. The picture that emerges from this and many similar movies is of a stoical, homely, quiet, disciplined, self-denying, kindly, honourable and dignified people who would infinitely rather be tending their gardens than defending the world against a fascist tyranny. (Paxman 2-3)

Possible Topics for Discussion

- 1. If possible, check out the movie yourself and argue about the credibility of the author’s interpretation of the film.**
- 2. What is the main point of this passage? If possible, please hand out another example for the class to make that point clearer.**

L. Research and Presentation: Film and Englishness #2

What does this most popular of English films [*Brief Encounter*, 1945] tell us about the English? Firstly that, in the immortal words, “we are not put on earth to enjoy ourselves.” Secondly, the importance of a sense of duty: wearing uniform had been a fact of life for most of the adult population. (Trevor Howard had been a lieutenant with the Royal Corps of Signals, with a number of entirely imaginary acts of heroism credited to him by the film studio’s publicity machines. Celia Johnson had been an auxiliary policewoman: they knew all about sacrificing their pleasures for a greater good.) Most of all, the message is that the emotions are there to be controlled. It was 1945. But it could as easily have been 1955 or even 1965; the fashions might have changed, but the weather would still be damp and the policemen still avuncular. It would, despite the post-war Welfare State, be a country where everyone knew their place. Delivery carts, driven by men in uniform, still brought milk and bread to the front door. There were things which were done and things which were not done.

One could assume about these people that they were decent, and as industrious as was necessary to meet comparatively modest ambitions. They had become accustomed to seeing themselves as

aggrieved against, steady under fire, defiant against the enemy. The image is of the British troops at Waterloo withstanding all-out assault by the French, or the dome of St Paul's emerging from the smoke and flames of German bombs. They had a deeply held sense of their own rights, yet would proudly say they were "not much bothered" about politics. The abject failure of both left- and right-wing extremists to get themselves elected to Parliament testified to their profound scepticism when anyone offered the promised land. They were, it is true, reserved and prone to melancholy. But they were not in any meaningful sense religious, the Church of England being a political invention which had elevated being "a good chap" to something akin to canonization. On the occasions when bureaucracy demands they admit an allegiance, they could write "C of E" in the box and know that they wouldn't be bothered by demands that they attend church or give all they had to the poor. (Paxman 5-6)

Possible Topics for Discussion

- 1. If possible, check out the movie yourself and state your opinion about the author's interpretation of the film.**
- 2. Several topics are discussed in this passage. Can you see any connection between them?**

M. Research and Presentation: What the 1950s survey shows

In 1951, the *People* newspaper organized a survey of its readers. For three years, Geoffrey Gorer pored over the 11,000 responses. At the end of which he concluded that the national character had not really changed much in the previous 150 years. The superficial changes had been vast: a lawless population had been turned into a law-abiding one; a country which enjoyed dog-fights, bear-baiting and public hangings had become humanitarian and squeamish; general corruption in public life had been replaced by a high level of honesty. But

what seems to have remained constant is a great resentment at being overlooked or controlled, a love of freedom; fortitude; a low interest in sexual activity, compared with most neighbouring societies; a strong belief in the value of education for the formation of character; consideration and delicacy for the feelings of other people; and a very strong attachment to marriage and the institution of the family. . . The English are a truly unified people, more unified, I would hazard, than at any previous period in their history. When I was reading, with extreme care, the first batch of questionnaires which I received, I found I was constantly making the same notes: "What dull lives most of these people appear to lead!" I remarked; and secondly, "What good people!" I should still make the same judgements.

The reason for this unity are obvious enough—the country had just come through a terrible war,

which had required shared sacrifice. The population of England was still relatively homogeneous, used to accepting the inconvenience of discipline and unaffected by mass immigration. It was still insular, not merely in a physical sense but because the mass media had yet to create the global village. (Paxman 6)

Possible topics for Discussion

- 1. What does this passage imply?**
- 2. Are the researcher Gorer and the author of the same opinion?**
- 3. What do the terms “insular” or “global village” mean?**

N. Research and Presentation: Marriage and other changing customs

The best part of 200,000 marriages now ended in divorce every year, with proceedings more often than not initiated by women, unprepared any longer to think “we must be sensible.” By the time of Prince Philip and Queen Elizabeth’s [Golden Wedding] celebrations, their four children had contracted three marriages, every single one of which had failed. The heir to the throne had divorced the woman intended to be the next queen, and she had met her death in a Paris underpass, alongside her playboy lover, Dodi Fayed, whose father, Mohammed, owned the most famous shop in the nation of shopkeepers, and made a habit of handing out money in brown paper envelopes to Conservative MPs, who claimed to belong to a party based on English traditions of probity and honour. Diana’s funeral had brought forth scenes of public mourning so bizarrely “un-English”—the lighting of candles in the park, the throwing of flowers on to her passing coffin—that the wartime generations could only look on as baffled travellers in their own land.

The flower-throwers had learned their behavior from watching television, for it is a Latin custom: the potency of the mass media can hardly be exaggerated. Fashions in food, clothing, music and entertainment are no longer home-grown. Even those customs which remain authentically indigenous are the fruit of a greatly changed “English” population. Within fifty years of the docking of the *Empire Windrush* at Tilbury, disembarking 492 Jamaican immigrants, the racial complexion of the country had changed utterly. Mass immigration to Britain had been concentrated on England and most cities of any size contained areas where white people had become rarity. In those places, talking about immigrants as “ethnic minorities” was beginning to sound decidedly perverse. By 1998, it was white children who had become a minority at local-authority secondary schools in inner London and even in the suburbs they made up only 60 percent of the secondary-school population. Over a third of inner London’s children did not even have English as their first language. (Paxman

7-8)

Possible Topics for Discussion

1. What was so “un-English” about Diana’s funeral?
2. Several topics are discussed in this passage. Can you see any connection between them? Or what do you think about the construction of the passage? Is it logical, or persuasive?